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Abstract
This article focuses on the application of antidiscrimination regimes to 
groups which have been discriminated-against de jure and de facto. This 
Article approaches diverges from the dominant view that discrimination 
is a purely destructive force. The central argument of the Article is that de 
jure, overt and blatant discrimination necessarily contributes to the 
creation of a coherent group identity recognized by law, which enables 
groups that are discriminated against to obtain remedial relief. In contrast, 
the law fails to recognize a coherent group identity for de facto 
discriminated-against groups and thus these groups have to overcome a 
structural challenge to obtain remedial relief to counter the 
discrimination. Thus, strangely, groups that are discriminated against de 
jure might be better off than groups that are discriminated against only de 
facto once one considers both the discriminatory and the remedial phases. 
After establishing the de jure/de facto distinction, the article explores the 
effects of this distinction on the equal protection claims of discriminated-
against groups by contrasting the experiences of African-Americans and 
Mexican-Americans. 
2The Limits of Equality and the Virtues of Discrimination
Yifat Bitton*
Table of content
Introduction: The Limited Paradigm of Streaming from De Jure Discrimination 
to De Jure Relief 
 
Part I: The Anti/Discrimination Discourse - Location, Location 
1) The De Jure – De Facto Distinction Discourse 
2) The Judicial Protection of Minorities Discourse 
3) The Equal Protection Discourse 
Part II: Formal De Jure Discrimination and its Effects – A Phenomenology 
1) The Semiotic Impact of Discrimination 
a) The Distinctiveness Effect 
b) The Visibility-Witnessing Effect (or "Unhappiness without a Title is 
Double Unhappiness") 
2) The Collaborating-Organizational Effect 
a) Through intra-group reactions 
 b) Through inter-group reactions 
3) The Institutional Memory and Blameworthy Effects 
4) The Presumption of Intentional Discrimination Effect 
Conclusion: Externalities for Cases of De Facto Discrimination 
 
Part III: The Battle for Segregation in Education as a Test Case 
 
Part IV: Pleading and Proving Discrimination within the Streaming from de 
facto to de jure Paradigm – A Call for Substance, Context and Consciousness 
 
Part V: Conclusion 
 
* Ph.D., The Hebrew University. I wish to acknowledge my special debt of gratitude to Duncan 
Kennedy and Janet Halley who have helped me out, supported, encouraged, and criticized me. This 
article was written during the time I spent as a Fulbright Fellow and a visiting researcher at Harvard 
Law School, and I wish to thank the Graduates Program’s Colloquium members for their comments 
during the presentation of this paper. I also thank Pnina Lahav, Yishai Blank, Daphne Barak-Erez, Roy 
Kreitner, Yael Aridor-Bar-Ilan, Eyal Diskin, and all others with whom I have discussed this Article, 
specifically Gerald Torres, Alvaro Santos, Hila Keren, Amalia Sa’ar and Claris Harbon. 
3“State power has made a significant difference 
– sometimes between life and death – 
 in the efforts of Black people to transform their world” 1
Introduction
Imagine discrimination as an advantageous stratagem – unimaginable? Not 
necessarily. This Article suggests that formal, overt and blatant discrimination in an 
early, discriminating stage could be helpful by enabling a discriminated group to 
establish itself, creating group recognition, and positioning the group as eligible for 
antidiscrimination relief at a later, remedial stage.    
 Antidiscrimination laws are one of the most significant areas where the law 
recognizes and seeks to redress suffering and injustice. They allow formerly 
discriminated-against groups to utilize the legal system to redistribute social power 
through variety of remedies. This Article approaches the prerequisite of 
antidiscrimination laws that there be some past or on-going discrimination in a 
manner that diverges from the dominant view that discrimination is a purely 
destructive force. In contrast, this Article argues that discrimination can be a positive 
force inasmuch as it provides legal recognition for a discriminated against group. In 
other words, sometimes legal discrimination can make a group better off than it 
otherwise would be by creating a group cohesiveness that the group can later use to 
access powerful legal remedies against past wrongs. 
 The Article advances a novel argument re-evaluating discriminatory legal 
rules as also having potentially important constructive, constitutive value for groups. 
This notion does not mean that discrimination is good. Rather, the argument is that a 
specific form of discrimination, namely de jure discrimination, not only negatively 
influences the well-being of the group that is discriminated against, but also has 
indirect positive effects on the well-being of the group later on by improving that 
group's ability to access the legal system to fight against this discrimination. The 
Article also suggests that in addition to influencing the well-being of the de jure 
discriminated group, de jure discrimination also indirectly influences groups that 
mainly suffer from another form of discrimination, namely de facto discrimination. 
 
1 Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in 
Antidiscrimination  Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331,1382 (1988).  
4Groups in the latter category will often lack the ability to access the legal system that 
groups in the former category generally has. Thus, strangely, groups that are 
discriminated against de jure might be better off than groups that are discriminated 
against only de facto once one considers both the discriminatory and the remedial 
phases. The reason for this paradox is simple: it is easier to fight legal battles for 
group remedy when a group has already been identified as the "outlawed" and is 
asking to be “inlawed”. In doctrinal terms, this Article's argument is apparent in the 
prerequisite of Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence that one should be 
discriminated against due to one’s membership in a recognizable, distinct group. 
Groups that suffer from de facto discrimination, as opposed to de jure discrimination, 
face structural barriers in fulfilling this requirement. 
 The hypothesis in this Article is that de jure discrimination has important 
effects. De jure discrimination perpetuates the identity of the discriminated group, it 
increases the sense of "realness" of the discrimination-based suffering, and it 
vindicates the group's need for and entitlement to legal redress. To put in other terms, 
although groups suffering from de jure discrimination were brutally excluded from 
society by the law, they were, at the same time, included in society's primary legal 
text, received "visibility" (albeit notorious visibility), and were constituted as a legal 
entity (albeit as a discriminated-against entity).2 These effects become evident 
through what this Article calls the "streaming from de jure discrimination paradigm," 
a phenomenon in which a group's struggle to become recognized by law as  
discriminated-against is reinforced when that discrimination is de jure. In other 
words, a group being de jure discriminated against at an early stage, which this 
Article designates the "discriminating stage," dramatically increases that group's 
prospects of recognition as a "legally discriminated group" that enjoys the right to 
obtain antidiscrimination relief during the later, "curing stage".3 This understanding of 
the interaction between de jure discrimination and legal relief demonstrates that the 
 
2In typifying “primary legal text” I exclude any non-regulatory official action and I include federal and 
state constitutional provisions, state primary [primary] legislation, local-specific regulations etc. My 
usage of this distinction as a version of the de jure / de facto distinction will be further elaborated 
below. 
 
3 The stage of commitment to the “antidiscrimination principle” begun gradually after the Civil War 
and during the Reconstruction, but is much more evident, coherent, and holistic since the mid-20th 
century. Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term - Forward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination 
Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1976). Kimberle Crenshaw marks the abolishment of the Jim Crow legal 
system as the crucial point of transition into the “formal equality” era. Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1377. 
5past existence of de jure discrimination is a key factor in determining the quality and 
quantity of the legal relief later available to the group and is a key factor in 
determining how difficult it is for the group to obtain such relief. This Article 
challenges the justness of the current "streaming from de jure discrimination 
paradigm" and instead proposes an alternative approach that is more sensitive to 
different modes of discrimination and thus more effective at fighting both substantive 
and formal discrimination, whether that discrimination is de facto or de jure.
This Article's analysis is relevant to any regime in which at the first stage 
dichotomous de jure and de facto discriminatory practices exist simultaneously and in 
which at the second stage antidiscrimination laws are used to remedy past 
discrimination.5 During the discrimination stage, all groups are subject to de facto 
discrimination, while only some of them are also explicitly subject to de jure 
discrimination. Although the theoretical application of the Article is more general, to 
demonstrate its implications, the Article concentrates on a real world example, 
contrasting American experiences of African- and Mexican Americans. The divergent 
experiences of these groups represent the different remedial treatment available to 
groups along the scale form de jure to de facto discrimination and help illustrate the 
implications of this Article's approach.  
 African-Americans are the most prominent group to suffer from de jure 
discrimination and represent the way in which "the streaming from de jure 
discrimination paradigm" creates a legally cognizable discriminated-against group. 
This group was the main target of America's de jure discrimination, both slavery and 
the Jim Crow, state-sponsored, constitutionally protected system of racial 
discrimination that took place after the abolition of slavery from 1890 through the 
mid-twentieth century.6 Mexican-Americans, on the other hand, do not fit into the de 
jure paradigm and demonstrate why the typical "streaming from de jure 
discrimination paradigm" needs to be revised. Mexican-Americans are considered 
America's "forgotten minority"; indeed, their status as a legally cognizable minority 
group is fragile even in the present day.7 Mexican-Americans did not explicitly fall 
 
5My argument is limited to racial discrimination since it is the hardest category to identify and 
determine, as opposed to gender-based groups or the group of the disabled, for example.     
 
6 On the Jim Crow legal system of segregation see F. James Davis, Who is Black? 51-70 (1991). On 
the constitutionality of slavery see Constitutional Law 422-431 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al., 4th ed., 2001). 
 
6under any of America's de jure discriminatory regulations during the Jim Crow era, 
despite the fact that Mexican-Americans were a substantial minority group at the 
time.8 However, although they almost did not suffer from prominent or legally visible 
de jure discrimination,9 Mexican-Americans did suffer from discriminatory practices 
such as chronic abuse and segregation.10 This discrimination was quite similar in its 
outcome to that suffered by groups suffering from de jure discrimination,11 except 
that the discrimination against Mexican-Americans did not primarily occur through 
the use of the formal, primary legal system. To date, despite being the largest minority 
group in America today,12 Mexican-Americans remain largely invisible in the 
American antidiscrimination discourse.13 
The dominant position of African-Americans over Mexican Americans in the 
antidiscrimination discourse has been widely discussed.14 This Article sheds new light 
 
7 Richard Delgado & Vicky Palacios, Mexican Americans as a Legally Cognizable Class under Rule 23 
and the Equal Protection Clause, 50 Notre Dame Lawyer 393 (1975) (arguing though that a huge 
change has occurred with Mexican-American identity); Reynaldo Anaya Valencia, Sonia R. Garcia, 
Henry Flores & Jose Roberto Juarez Jr, Mexican Americans & the Law 16 (2004) [hereinafter: 
Mexican Americans & the Law]. 
8 The survey was conducted in Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas, the southern 
states in which most Mexican-Americans resided. See Gary A. Greenfield & Don B. Kates, Mexican 
Americans, Racial Discrimination, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 Cal. L. Rev. 662, 680 (1975). 
9 To be sure, I do not intend to state that there was no formal regulatory de jure discrimination against 
Mexican-Americans whatsoever. However, this form of discrimination was sporadic and rare. See for 
example a Californian regulation known as the “Greaser Act” from 1855, in which vagrancy was 
banned on “all persons who are commonly known as ‘Greasers’ or the issue of Spanish…blood…” 113 
Cal. Stat. 175 (1855) excerpted in Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some 
Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1994) 
(Undermines the “realness” of acknowledged races and arguing that races exist only as powerful social 
phenomena) .For an exploration of the experience of Mexican-Americans under the legal system of the 
United States from 1848 to 1946 see Martha Menchaca, Chicano Indianism: A Historical Account of 
Racial Repression in the United States, 20 Am. Ethnologist 583 (1993). Menchaca’s historical review 
reveals some differentiation between the American discriminatory treatment of Mexicans of Indian 
descent and Mexicans of European-Spanish descent, in favor of the latter. Mexicans of Indian descent 
were simply perceived as “Indians” rather than as “Mexicans”. Id, at 585-591. 
10 For a brief history of Mexican-American encounters with the law see Mexican Americans & the Law,
supra note 7, at 4-10. 
 
11 Greenfield & Kates, supra note 8, at 687. 
 
12 U.S. Census figures identify Latinos as "the largest minority group in the U.S.” See Margaret E. 
Montoya, A Brief History of Chicana/o School Segregation: One Rationale for Affirmative Action, 12 
Berkeley La Raza L.J. 159, 162 (2000-01). 
13 Eduardo Luna, How the Black/White Paradigm Renders Mexicans/Mexican Americans and 
Discrimination Against Them Invisible, 14 La Raza L. Jour 225 (2003) (suggesting that Mexican-
Americans have not suffered from discrimination or that they never resisted it).  
14 See generally, Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby - LatCrit 
Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 1585, 1596 (1997) (determining a black 
exceptionalism to other discriminated groups in America); Andrew Hacker, Two Nations: Black and 
7on this discussion and suggests that the difference between the two groups represents 
also the different forms of discrimination suffered by them. Although one may 
consider it fairly obvious that different types of discrimination lead to different 
treatment in the discrimination discourse, this specific difference between the groups-
- where African-Americans have enjoyed genuine legal recognition as a 
discriminated-against group, while Mexican-Americans have not--nonetheless 
demands further inquiry.  
 Methodologically, this Article focuses on litigation over segregation, 
primarily in education, as the way in which these different groups engage in the 
discrimination discourse. It traces the various ways in which segregation litigation has 
contributed to producing the legal recognition of groups that suffered de jure 
segregation as opposed to the way it has shaped (or failed to shape) the legal 
recognition of groups that suffered primarily from de facto segregation. The former 
have come to be recognized as strong, cohesive groups, whereas the latter have 
acquired at best fragile group recognition.  
 This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I situates the Article's analysis at the 
juncture of the forms of discrimination and equal protection analyses as they relates to 
other proximate analyses. Part II explores the advantages of de jure discrimination, 
namely that it creates legally cognizable groups and thereby enhances the ability of 
that group to obtain de jure relief. Part III describes the ways in which the current 
rights discourse misses the process by which groups that suffer from de facto 
discrimination seek to achieve de jure relief. The focus in this part is on the ways in 
which American courts, dealing with segregation litigation in education, have failed 
to apply antidiscrimination law paradigms to groups that have typically suffered from 
de facto discrimination. Part IV argues for the greater use of contextual tools in 
 
White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal (1992) 16 (considers the Fourteenth Amendment and its 
antidiscrimination jurisprudence as tailored to African-Americans’ experience). For a contrary position, 
see Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science" of American 
Racial Thought, 85 Calif. L. Rev. 1219 (1997). Courts do not necessarily uphold the paradigm. See 
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District, 324 F. Supp. 599, 606 (S.D. Tex. 1970) 
(suggesting that “…the Mexican-Americans residing in this district have experienced deprivations and 
discriminations similar to those suffered by the district's Negroes, and they share with the Negro the 
special problems involved in overcoming existing divisive conditions and the stigma and disadvantage 
that have accompanied their segregation”). Other scholarship contends that the current socioeconomic 
status of Mexican Americans is even worse than that of African-Americans. See Luna, supra note 13, 
at 229. The 2000 United States Census reveals that Latinos currently comprise the largest minority 
group and suffer from greater segregation than African-Americans. See Montoya, supra note 12, at 
162. On the shared conceptual prejudice against both groups see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, 
Critical Race Theory (2001) 76-74.
8applying antidiscrimination rules to de facto discrimination. Courts should be more 
attentive to the full legal history of a group pleading discrimination and the lack de 
jure discrimination against a group should not necessarily limit the legal recognition 
that group should receive during the remedial stage. Part V concludes.  
 
Part I: The Anti/Discrimination Discourse - Location, Location 
This article’s argument is located at the intersection of discrimination and anti-
discrimination theories and discourses and it challenges the traditional conception of 
the ways in which they intersect. This part discusses the different ways in which the 
theories and discourses intersect and how this Article's argument affects them. 
1) The De jure – De facto Distinction discourse 
 What makes an act “de jure” and thus makes it eligible for judicial review? Is 
a single, concrete decision by a low hierarchy official as de jure as an action is under 
a federal statute? Over time, the distinction between de jure and de facto has been 
progressively blurred, and sometimes this distinction signifies little more than a legal 
conclusion. This ephemeral distinction has been criticized as having an elusive, false 
jurisprudential effect, enabling court to draw a thin, changeable line between de facto 
and de jure acts.15 Though fully aware of this criticism and supportive of it, this 
Article still argues that at some level the distinction matters; specifically, the 
distinction matters to the way in which groups discriminated against in different ways 
perceive themselves politically and to the way in which those groups are perceived by 
others. This Article employs the distinction consciously in its extreme technical sense 
in order to make this theoretical point. Using the phrase de jure discrimination, I have 
in mind a most materialistic, formal meaning, namely discrimination that is effected 
by overt, explicit, and systematic laws and regulations. De facto actions of 
discrimination, on the other hand, result from actions that are covert and that are less 
or not formalized in primary legal texts. These two poles of discrimination, 
nonetheless, are located along a continuum, in which the more resemblance the type 
of discrimination being complained of bears to one of the poles, the more squarely the 
argument made in this Article applies. 
 
15 For a challenge of this distinction in order to demonstrate a de jure discrimination that allows for de 
jure relief see Jorge C. Rangel & Carlos M. Alcala (Project Report), De Jure Segregation of Chicanos 
in Texas Schools, 7 Harv. Civil Rt-Civil Lib. L. Rev. 307 (1972) (challenging the denial of de jure 
discriminated-against status for Chicanos in Texas). 
9The discussion of the role of the de jure/de facto distinction in the current 
discrimination analysis has been somewhat meager and one-dimensional. The Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restrains only state action, and thus 
only counters de jure discrimination. This truth has profoundly limited courts' power 
to confront non-de jure discriminatory actions. Since they occurred with little if any 
legal record, de facto discriminatory practices were more difficult to track than de jure 
discriminatory practices. Particularly in the struggle for desegregation in education, 
artificial and blurred lines were drawn between largely similar discriminating acts by 
public authorities.16 These arbitrary lines had a devastating effect on the struggle of de 
facto discriminated against groups to overcome such discrimination.17 In many cases, 
courts refused to provide relief for complaints made about segregating practices on 
the grounds that those practices were not de jure and thus did not provide grounds for 
judicial intervention.18 
The traditional critique of the distinction between de jure and de facto 
discrimination is different than the one this Article stresses. The traditional critique's 
main goal is to facilitate a re-conceptualization of de jure acts to include acts that are 
currently perceived as de facto ones with the eventual end goal of dismantling the 
distinction.19 This Article, rather, stresses that the distinction, though largely 
unjustified, has yet some meaningful effects that have been so far ignored in the 
attempts to normatively abolish the distinction. The Article proposes a 
phenomenological insight on the systematic effects that the divergent forms of 
discrimination have in creating "legally cognized discriminated groups". 
 
16 For this conception see the opinions of Justices Douglas and Powell in Keyes v. School District No.1 
Denver, Colorado case, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). The judges criticized this conception and clarified that 
any discrimination administered by a state agency, regardless of its informal basis, as in the case of a 
discriminatory unwritten policy and decisions by officials, is a state action under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Referring to the Board of Education's acts presented as "de facto discrimination," Justice 
Douglas declared that "each is but another form of de jure discrimination" and suggests there should be 
no constitutional implications to the distinction once the force of law is placed behind the defendants. 
Id, at 216. 
17 Id, at 218-19. Justice Powell suggested abandoning it in favor of adopting a broader conception of 
constitutional justice. See Mexican Americans & the Law, supra note 7, at 27-28. 
18 See George A. Martinez, Legal Indeterminacy Judicial Discretion and the Mexican-American 
Litigation Experience: 1930-1980, 27 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 555, 586-603 (1994) (presenting the various 
petitions declined based on the de jure/de facto distinction). 
19 See Cisneros, supra note 14, at 617-18 (reconceptualizating the facts as de jure acts). For a 
comprehensive example of such a project, see Rangel & Alcala, supra note 15.  
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2) The Judicial Protection of Minorities Discourse  
The de jure/de facto distinction’s critique is significant to scholarship on the 
justification for having judicial review that favors discriminated-against groups.20 In 
his article on the judiciary’s legitimate role in protecting minority rights, Bruce 
Ackerman used an interest-group analysis to reorient the doctrine of judicial 
intervention in minority rights.21 Ackerman pointed out the misconceptions embedded 
in the Supreme Court's standard "discrete and insular" definition for determining 
which groups are entitled to judicial protection through the Equal Protection Clause.22 
He specifically argues that the Court has failed to evaluate the real need for judicial 
intervention on behalf of "anonymous and defused" minorities; Ackerman argues that 
these groups need protection since they are typically less politically empowered  than 
the "discrete and insular" minorities. The argument here follows Ackerman's and, to 
some extent, criticizes it as ignoring worsened groups in need for judiciary protection, 
namely, minorities which are "anonymous, defused and legally absent". 
Although Ackerman's argument focuses on the separation of powers and the 
judiciary's power to nullify discriminatory statutes, it also suggests a broader, 
enduring role for the judiciary with regard to protecting minorities.23 Ackerman's 
analysis presupposes a viable legal recognition of the minority group, since he targets 
the anti-democratic nature of the de jure discrimination from which that group suffers. 
His basic idea is that the less politically effective a discriminated against group is, the 
more courts are democratically empowered to operate to protect that group. In the 
case of legally absent minorities, this political weakness is especially pronounced. For 
example, these minorities lack the "visibility" necessary for the political system to 
recognize their suffering or to enable them to accumulate political power. This Article 
argues that these features are heavily influenced by whether a group is discriminated 
against de jure or de facto, stressing the need for a reconsideration of how we define 
what a minority group is for remedial purposes. 
3) The Equal Protection Discourse  
 Recognition of a group is a prerequisite to that group asserting an Equal 
Protection Claim by one of its members. But the group recognition this Article is 
concerned with is not the commonly discussed nature of the group that is relevant to 
 
20 Developments in the Law – Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1125 (1968-1969). 
21 Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1985). 
22 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).  
23 Ackerman, supra note 21, at 715.  
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what level of judicial review applies to laws affecting that group.24 Rather, the 
concept of group recognition in this Article is unconcerned with what level of judicial 
review will apply, since a group’s desire to be classified as a “suspect category” to 
receive the highest level of judicial protection is not a struggle to be recognized as a 
group. For example, laws discriminating against women are subject to a lower level of 
judicial scrutiny than African-Americans, yet women are the clearest legally 
cognizable group.  
The type of group recognition this Article is concerned with is the requirement 
under the Equal Protection Clause that any group challenging a discriminatory act 
would have enough distinctiveness so as to have standing to raise the discrimination 
claim.25 This requirement under the Equal Protection Clause, although rarely 
discussed, is crucial in pleading a constitutional violation: “the first step is to establish 
that the group is one that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different 
treatment under the laws, as written or as applied”.26 The Equal Protection Clause 
thus incorporates a group-based ideology even while maintaining the individualistic 
nature of claims.27 That is, one being part of a group--and the sameness one shares 
with that group--is necessary as a foundation for any individual allegation of 
discrimination. In this context, the lack of legal recognition as a group that is evident 
in de facto discriminated against groups like Mexican-Americans means that these 
groups have only a fragile, partial, and hesitant recognition. This limited recognition 
means that in order to win an equal protection claim, the group identify must be 
constantly and repetitively reassured before court. Thus, the effects of de jure 
discrimination structurally limit the scope of equal protection that de facto 
discriminated groups enjoy. 
 
24 See John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 685-692 (7th ed., 2004). 
25 This prerequisite is different from the “standing doctrine” requisite embedded in Article III of the 
Constitution. See Constitutional Law: Cases, Comments, Questions 1507-1518 (Jesse H. Choper et al., 
9th ed., 2001). 
26 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977); see also Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478-
479. 
27 On the individualistic framework of the equal protection clause, see Kevin D. Brown, The Dilemma 
of Legal Discourse for Public Educational Responses to the "Crisis" Facing African- American Males, 
23 Cap. U. L. Rev. 63, 71-87 (1994). On the role of the clause as protecting groups, see Owen M. Fiss, 
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107, 123-127 (1976). However, this 
Article’s argument does not rely on a communal perception of the Equal Protection Clause, since even 
an individual claimant needs to prove membership in a group.  
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Part II: Formal De Jure Discrimination and its Effects – A Phenomenology 
 Discriminated groups, as political categories, are created and recreated within 
particular regimes of hegemony-power, and the language of law plays an important 
role in this ongoing process. The de jure/de facto distinction is important to 
understanding the way in which discriminated groups are constructed through the 
legal text. The distinction affects a group's recognition in various ways through the 
different stages of discrimination and the development of antidiscrimination law. The 
difficulty, however, is that antidiscrimination law was initially based on the type of 
redressed discrimination being de jure.28 Law is one important source from which 
people draw their sense of reality and "realness." It is one of society's most reliable 
mechanisms of producing reality or, as others sees it, of reflecting reality.29 It is the 
place where social consensus and dominant beliefs are being realized. De jure 
discrimination creates "differences" between groups, recognizes those differences, 
and construes those differences as meaningful in reality. Therefore, the absence of 
groups - or their "differences" - from society's legal texts might signify their non-
existence. 
By asserting that legal texts matter, this Article embraces the basic idea of 
social construction of reality theories in general and social construction of reality 
through law, in particular. It treats primary legal texts as a major symbolic instrument 
in the production and reproduction of power structures, and thereby calls for a 
problematization of any alleged naturalness of the antidiscrimination discourse. The 
effects presented below manifest the influence that de jure discrimination has on the 
construction of a recognized discriminated-against group within the antidiscrimination 
discourse. This phenomenon is distilled through the utilization of different methods 
from various disciplines, such as the semiotics of law, the rhetorics of law and the 
sociology of law. Additionally, the effects apply simultaneously to different players 
and agents in the construction process of recognizing a group as discriminated-
against: some of them affect the discriminated-against group members themselves, 
while others affect the members of the hegemonic group, who also constitute the 
 
28 It has been argued that the Court is approaching discrimination issues based on the assumption of 
formal, blatant discrimination even though de jure discrimination almost is now rare. See Michael 
Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 Geo. L. J. 279, 
285 (1997) (“As long as… blatant barriers do not exist, the Court has difficulty seeing discrimination”). 
29 This Article’s interest is not in the ideological controversy over the force of law as a sociological 
move or the law’s role in creating social norms. See Introduction to Critical Race Theory: The Key 
Writings That Formed the Movement, xxiv (Kimberle W. Crenshaw et al., 1995). 
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shaping of the different groups, from inside the legal system (such as regulators, 
lawyers and judges) and from outside of it.  
Though comprising many of these methodological constituents at different 
levels, the effects themselves are organized around their outcomes, meaning that they 
are presented in correlation to the way they contribute to the process of founding the 
discriminated-against group as a subject for relief implementation.30 
The Article will now trace the effects that the different types of discrimination 
have on creating a group as a legal entity in the remedial stage.31 The effects are all 
relevant to the way in which a discriminated-against group's status as a legal entity, 
with legal relevance to anti-discrimination relief, is generated. However, the effects 
themselves are somewhat independent from one another and have a cumulative 
influence on the formation of the group as legal entity, rather than having a gradual, 
dependent influence where one effect flows from the other. Nevertheless, the common 
thread between these effects is the way in which they allow the formation of de jure 
discriminated-against groups as legal entities and the way the lack of these factors 
burdens de facto discriminated-against groups.  
The effects of de jure discrimination that will be addressed in this Part confine 
the ability of a group to participate in the remedial stage, thus structurally barring 
groups that are not victims of de jure but of de facto discrimination  from benefiting 
in the curing stage. For these groups that are "legally absent" groups, the 
antidiscrimination battlefield is especially difficult, since they have to fight for redress 
in an area where they were never formally acknowledged as injured. 
 
1) The Semiotic Impact of Discrimination 
 a) The Distinctiveness Effect 
 Discrimination is a form of exclusion, which demands the identification and 
acknowledgment of the excluded entity subject to different treatment. "Identifying" 
the characteristics of the subject upon which exclusion is based requires that the 
 
30 This article is less interested in the methodological motivations of the process of recognizing a group 
as discriminated-against. Rather, it focuses on the legal aspects and manifestations of this process, 
understood through the abovementioned methodological constituents.    
31  In tracing these different stages, the Article does not intend to expose a coherent, consistent, and 
gradual progress of the legal discourse on discrimination. Moreover, the different stages must have 
been infused with and influenced one another and they may not even constitute some developmental 
phases. Garry Peller, Frontier of Legal Thought III: Race Consciousness, 1990 Duke L. J. 758 (1990) 
(considering some of the stages as a mere reflection of the opposing political ideologies of the 
integrationist and the nationalist movements in the late 1960s and early 1970s). 
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subject has a distinctiveness common with the excluded group. From this viewpoint, 
the discourse of discrimination both causes the "other" to suffer from deprivation and, 
at the same time, forms that same "other" group.32 Paradoxically, the discriminating 
discourse retains some maneuvering potential since the legal language that the de jure 
discrimination employs against the groups plays into the hands of these very same 
discriminated groups when the remedial stage begins. Discriminated-against groups 
can now use the same classifying rhetoric that was used to define and exclude their 
group for their own benefit. In a sense, then, discriminated groups are able to trap the 
legal system by its own definitional creations. In other words, a group's distinct 
existence at the remedial stage is a consequence of the group identity and knowledge 
that was produced by the prior stage’s discriminatory discourse that recognized the 
group's “legal entity” by discriminating against that group. This existence of a "legal 
entity" means that the discriminated against group need not prove that the group has 
any "real" or essential existence; rather, the fact that the legal system treated the group 
as real is sufficient. The legal system, which creates this group identity and 
knowledge during the de jure discrimination phase, cannot ignore or re-contextualize 
the group identity at the remedial stage. Especially for racially categorized groups, 
whose composition is socially ambiguous and often based on vague characterizations, 
this effect of the law creating their legal identity is highly valuable in the remedial 
stage.33 It should be stressed, however, that this process does not imply that prior to it 
there were no meanings of “race” attached to groups such as African-Americans or 
Mexican-Americans outside the legal apparatus. Rather, it is suggested that racial 
groups as we know them today within the antidiscrimination discourse were shaped, 
in part, by the discrimination discourse.34 
The African-American group is a prominent illustration of this effect. The 
distinctiveness of the group was created through various discriminatory provisions of 
the law that needed to and shamelessly did define what a "Negro” was.35 These 
 
32 This notion is compatible with Foucault’s perception of discrimination as an instrument for 
establishing identities and differences. See Chris Horrocks, Introducing Foucault 64 (1999). 
33 Racial groups are here being contrasted with the cases of other groups; with women, for example, 
biology provides rather prominent distinctiveness to the group’s members. 
34 This idea is compatible with Ian Haney Lopez’s idea that races as they form part of our discourse 
today should not be understood as constructed by the shared history of their members and nothing else, 
but rather that it was their members’ shared history of oppression that shaped these races in their 
current appearance. See Haney Lopez, supra note 9, at 38.  
35 The Texas statute, for example, identified “Negros” as “all persons of mixed blood descended from 
Negro ancestry” or “a Negro or person of African descent”. Pauli Murray, States’ Laws on Race and 
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definitions were designed to meet the need to statutorily identify a person for 
exclusionary purposes36 and thereby created an indisputable "African-American  legal 
entity", sustained by a rhetoric that enabled the courts to identify the group and 
exempted them from justifying their choices of identification. Moreover, the legal 
system was indifferent to the divergent definitions used to “identify” the group, as the 
notorious case of Plessy v. Ferguson demonstrates. In Plessy, the Court considered 
Louisiana’s legal definition of African-Americans to be a matter of state legislative 
autonomy.37 The Court specifically refrained from defining the plaintiff’s race, 
indicating that so long as the segregation laws identified him as “colored,” his unique 
racial condition was legally irrelevant.38 The Court settled for the adoption of the 
statute’s language as the relevant legal definition for identifying the plaintiff's group. 
Adopting this definition also allowed the Court to ignore strong objections to the 
notion that there is any “real” biological meaning to race.39 
On the other hand, the courts’ desire to look to statutory definitions rather than 
consider racial categorizations on their own initiative stood in the way of Mexican-
Americans being recognized as a discriminated against group for remedial purposes.40 
The first case to acknowledge Mexican-Americans as a legally identifiable non-white 
group was Hernandez v. Texas,41 in 1954, where the Court concluded that the 
systematic exclusion of Mexican-Americans from jury duty on the basis of their 
“class” was unconstitutional.42 Nevertheless, in this decision the Court refused to 
adopt a broad conception of the affected group and instead pointed to evidence about 
the local discriminatory practices against Mexican-Americans; thus, the Court 
established the existence of Mexicans-Americans as an identifiable class only within 
 
Color 443-44 (1997). For the various terms used for "naming" African-Americans in general see 
Randall Kennedy, Nigger – The Strange Career of a Troublesome Word (2002). 
36 For the myriad “naming” of other groups in America who were not whites, see the comprehensive 
research considering discriminatory legislation all over the U.S. in Murray, id.
37 163 U.S. 537 (1896).   
38 The petitioner, as the Court admitted, was "only 1/8 black" and had “Caucasian looks”. Id, at 542 
39 Lisa K. Pomeroy, Restructuring Statistical Policy Directive No. 15: Controversy over Race 
Categorization and the 2000 Census, 32 U. Tol. L. Rev. 67 (2000) (shows that racial categories are not 
generic or natural but rather are a social construct). There is a clear discrepancy between the social 
science acceptance of the social nature of race and the legal system's refusal to accept this notion. Id, at 
69-70. Also see Haney Lopez, supra note 9.  
40 For example, see the cases discussed in Delgado & Palacios, supra note 7, in which Mexican-
Americans were not recognized as a group for class action and equal protection purposes.  
41 Supra note 26. 
42 The Court refused, though, to identify the group on the basis of race or color. For the devastating 
consequences of this reluctance, see Ian Haney Lopez, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure: The Salience of Race 
to LatCrit Theory, 85 Calif. L. Rev. 1158 (1997). 
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specific circumstances. The contrasting experience of African-Americans is 
commonly shown, but is harder to trace, since for the Court, it is unquestioned that the 
group is identifiable.43 For Example, in Brown v. Board of Education44, the Court, 
introducing the various petitioners from different states, as “minors of the Negro 
race,” affirmed and acknowledged, without reservation, their status as a generally 
identifiable group.45 This group recognition has generalized not only different 
geographic areas, but also various realms of discrimination, other than segregation in 
education, to which the group recognition diffused.46 
Although celebrated as a landmark step toward achieving legal visibility for 
Mexican-Americans,47 Hernandez also posed a difficult legacy for the group, since it 
relied on a localized rather than nationalized conception of the "group." This localized 
conception forced later Mexican-American petitioners to bear the heavy cost of 
repeatedly establishing local discrimination in each case. Strangely enough, for 
example, a plaintiff with a similar claim of discrimination in jury selection in Texas 
was forced to again prove that he belonged to an identifiable group because his 
petition related to different county than the one at issue in Hernandez.48 This legacy 
caused courts to refuse to recognize the group's standing for purposes of equal 
protection claims. Even in cases when it was decided that Mexican-Americans were a 
discriminated against group, like in the important case of Cisneros v. Corpus Christi 
Ind. School District,49 the court’s rhetoric was never the definitive rhetoric that would 
have recognized Mexican-Americans as a broad, rather than a local, group. The 
semiotic impact was apparent: lacking any de jure discrimination to define the group 
before it, the Court has looked for "cultural", "biological", and "social" evidence to 
support the existence of Mexican-Americans as a group.50 Moreover, the distinctive 
 
43 See infra note 53-54, and accompanied text.  
44 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
45 Id, at 487. 
46 See for example, Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (An equal protection claim of a 
"negro" after the club denied him service); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (An equal protection 
claim of "Negro citizens"\"black citizens" against the local authority which decided that closing a 
public pool was preferred over desegregating it). 
47 Mexican Americans & the Law, supra note 7, at 16. 
48 For example, see the court's words in a case concluding "It appears and the court so finds that there is 
in Bexar County an identifiable ethnic group referred to as Mexican Americans…" United States v. 
Hunt, 265 F. Supp. 178, 188 (W.D. Tex. 1967). Ten years later, an all-Texas Mexican-American group 
was considered identifiable in that same matter. See Castaneda, supra note 26.  
49 324 F. Supp 599, at 606-607 (1970). 
50 In this case, the court declared that the group was an identifiable as an ethnic minority. However, in 
order to justify its conclusion which was not derived from a de jure definition of the group, the court, in 
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characteristics of Mexican-American's – such as their surnames, cultural heritage, and 
appearance - have constantly been questioned on the grounds that they lack social 
“realness” or relevance to creating a group identity for Mexican-Americans. This 
confusion is captured in the sincere struggle of courts and their rhetoric inability to 
conclusively identify the group before them:51 
“It is clear to this court that Mexican-Americans, or Americans with 
Spanish surnames, or whatever they are called, or whatever they would 
like to be called, Latin-Americans, or several other new names of 
identification -- and parenthetically the court will take notice that this 
naming for identification phenomena is similar to that experienced in 
the Negro groups: black, Negro, colored, and now black again, with an 
occasional insulting epithet that is used less and less by white people… 
fortunately…it is clear to this court that these people for whom we 
have used the word Mexican-Americans to describe their class, group, 
or segment of our population, are an identifiable ethnic minority… 
This is not surprising; we can notice and identify their physical 
characteristics, their language, their predominant religion, their distinct 
culture, and, of course, their Spanish surnames. 
 
In searching for "a name," and lacking any prior de jure definition of the 
group, the court is forced to create the group on its own. Trying to come with an 
acceptable definition, the court compares the naming difficulty with Mexican-
Americans to the name changes that have accompanied the African-American group; 
this comparison, though, exemplifies the differences between the groups caused by 
their distinct discrimination forms. As opposed to court’s analogy, the "naming" 
experiences of the two groups in fact diverged both in reason and in outcome. The 
"list of names" for African-Americans that court lists represents the abundance of 
identifications that were attached by de jure discrimination; thus, there was no 
confusion or indeterminacy in the remedial stage, only different names attached to a 
well-defined group. Thus, these names have not compromised the ability of courts to 
consistently identify the group before them as the same group of African-Americans. 
The Mexican-American "list" of names, however, demonstrates the lack of any prior 
legal definition of the group for court to rely upon at the curing stage. 
 
a footnote, considered an expert's testimony on the matter and discussed at length the characteristics of 
an identifiable group. Id, id (footnotes 29 and 30). 
51 Id, at 606-608.
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Later cases in which court again held that Mexican-Americans are an 
identifiable class, like the infamous Keyes case,52 have not yet had the all-
encompassing effect of creating group recognition.53 In sum, unlike African-
Americans, Mexican-Americans had to each time first constitute themselves as a 
group and only then make their specific allegations of discrimination. The United 
States v. Texas Education Agency54 desegregation case is a sharp exemplary of that 
effect. The petitioners in this case were both African-Americans and Mexican-
Americans. Nevertheless, the Court voiced his concern only with whether the latter 
constituted an identifiable group while having no similar concerns regarding the 
former.55 
b) The Visibility-Witnessing Effect (or "Unhappiness without a Title is 
Double Unhappiness"56)
The legal discourse of discrimination not only classifies groups and shapes 
their distinctiveness, but also manifests their presence. Presence is therefore the 
signifie of discrimination, its signifiant.57 De jure discrimination gives public presence 
to its subjects and narrates their discriminated experience. In the remedial stage, the 
same narrative that was used by the legal system for discrimination against the group 
is used to justify giving anti-discrimination relief to the members of that group. 
Moreover, number of different situations in which de jure discrimination existed 
created multiple narratives of oppression and exclusion that had to be revealed in the 
remedial stage: where de jure discrimination ordered segregated schools, the narrative 
of exclusion from the education system had been told; where it ordered employment 
segregation, the narrative of exclusion from the employment market had been told; 
and so forth. These narratives of discrimination, suffering, and deprivation were 
 
52 Supra note 16. The Court declared that this class existed “for purposes of the fourteenth 
amendment". 
53 Delgado & Palacios, supra note 7, at 396. 
54 467 F.2d 848, 852(1972) 
55 Id, at 852: "Mexican-Americans in many cities in Texas are an identifiable ethnic minority…" 
Nevertheless, in many other cases where members of both groups applied jointly, there was no such 
inquiry as to the status of Mexican-Americans. My guess would be that the presence of African-
Americans as petitioners redeemed the group recognition problem of Mexican-Americans since the 
former constituted the required eligibility for relief against the white hegemony anyway. 
56 Hanna Arendt, Rahel Varnhagen – The Life of a Jewess 173 (1997). 
57 For an elaboration on the semiotics of the law see Bernard S. Jackson, Semiotics and Legal Theory 
(1997). 
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outlined by de jure regulations and affected the transparency and visibility of both the 
group’s existence and the group's oppression. 
This effect is part of a larger theoretical scheme of "visibility," emphasizing 
the powerfulness of the legal discourse, which excludes minorities by their absence 
them from legal texts and reasoning. This absence from the law's formal and 
substantive foundations designate the excluded party as the "other" and demonstrate 
that its needs are as unimportant to the legal world as they are elsewhere in society.58 
The argument of this Article exceeds the limits of this "invisibility" critique. It argues 
that “absence” refers not only to absence from receiving the benefits of the law, but 
also an absence from suffering from the drawbacks of the law, specifically being 
absent from the legal discrimination mechanism. The alleged invisibility of de jure 
discriminated-against groups marks them as the "other," whereas the absence of de 
facto discriminated-against groups signifies their complete non-existence.59 For 
example, using legal language to determine the "nature" of a person in order to 
classify him or her under a Jim Crow statute's requirements shapes the notion of a 
legal category. Silence, on the other hand, is a choice not only not to include but also 
a choice at the same time not to exclude. Silence is the decision to "non-clude." By 
"non-cluding," this Article means a situation where a group is being discriminated 
against yet is not being subjugated by explicit formal expressions of the law. The 
group is fully "named" by society's coercion since it suffers from discrimination, but 
is nameless under the law. Moreover, it does not exist as a group or entity. Although it 
is true that discriminated-against groups such as women and African-Americans also 
suffered from injustice and inequality that might be termed "lawlessness," they were 
at the same time subject to the control of the legal system and thus were subject to 
lawfulness.60 These groups are therefore relatively visible on the spectrum of 
"visibility"; in contrast, Mexican-Americans fall into a category of extreme 
invisibility. 
 
58 See, e.g., Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 
Am. U.L. Rev. 1065 (1985) (Discusses the invisibility of women in contract law). 
59 For a close analysis of invisibility and non-existence see Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or 
Hale and Foucault, Legal Studies Forum 327, 333 (1991). 
60 For lawlessness in women's life see Marjorie Maguire Schultz, The Voices of Women: A Symposium 
in Legal Education: The Gendered Curriculum of Contracts and Carreers, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 55, 58 
(1991) (arguing that contract laws deserted paradigmatic contractual issues regarding familial 
relations). On lawlessness in African-American's life see Frankie Y. Bailey & Alice P. Green, Law 
Never Here (Westport, Connecticut, 1999) (describing in a short story the devastating meanings that 
law had in the lives of black slaves). 
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 De facto discriminated against groups extends another extreme of the visibility 
spectrum. “Invisibility” is commonly used to describe also the omnipresence of a 
group that need not be “named”, rather than describe the non-existence of the “un-
named” group. Drawing on the work of Pierre Bourdieu and treating the law as a 
quintessential arena of symbolic power, one can regard the normative classification of 
“whiteness” as unmarked and “blackness” as marked as an objectified form of white 
hegemony.61 The invisible unmarked or “un-named” is the group whose dominance 
and hegemony shapes the relevant social system and thus does not need to be 
explicitly named and presented.62 In legal terms, critical theory argues that the law 
represents the white-male-heterosexual epistemology and life-experience and thus this 
group does not need to be named in the law.63 Therefore, this archetype's absence 
from the legal texts is misleading since it reflects the group's constituting presence. In 
this Article, however, the terminology of “un-naming” is being used in a different 
manner. By “un-named” groups, this Article means those that suffer from an impotent 
absence, and not from an all-encompassing omnipresence. This Article contrasts the 
“naming” of minorities, such as African-Americans and women, not only with the 
“un-naming” of the dominant group of white men but also with the “un-naming” of 
other discriminated-against groups. Considering these other discriminated-against 
groups visible challenges the traditional conceptualization of “naming” as 
exclusionary and “un-naming” as inclusive. Instead, this Article suggests a broader 
conception that will treat the “un-named” discriminated groups as being as invisible 
as a group can be. Moreover, the invisible normality of whiteness manifested in the 
law as well as achieved through it, engages the law as a “white public space” in which 
the unmarked is simply white.64 In this symbolic space, the un-named group is 
eliminated and marginalized as a discriminated-against group, through its being 
merged into the white public space as an inseparable part of it. However, this process 
 
61 Pierre Bourdieu, Social Space and Symbolic Power, 7 Sociological Theory 14 (1989) 
62 Simon De-Beauvoir, The Second Sex (1949); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory 
of the State 96-105 (1989). 
63 On the “whiteness” of the law see Kenneth B. Nunn, Law as a Eurocentric Enterprise, 15 Law & 
Ineq. 323 (1997). 
64 White public space is fashioned as: “Either in its material or symbolic dimensions, white public space 
is comprised of all the places where racism is reproduced by the professional class. That space may 
entail particular or generalized locations, sites, patterns, configurations, tactics, or devices that 
routinely, discursively, and sometimes coercively privilege Euro-Americans over nonwhites”. Helan 
Page & Brook Thomas, White Public Space and the Construction of White Privilege in U.S. Health 
Care: Fresh Concepts and a New Model of Analysis, 8 Medical Anthropology Quarterly 109, 111 
(1994). 
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does not signify inclusion of the group, since in reality it is discriminated-against, de
facto.
The theoretical scheme of "invisibility" this Article addresses is affected by 
the legal visibility of the group as follows. Different, relative degrees of legal 
visibility and invisibility are located on a continuum. At one end there are laws that 
make the "otherness" of the laws' subject explicit. For example, laws denying access 
to public facilities that specifically named "Blacks" made the "otherness" of African-
Americans apparent. In this case the discriminated group is more overtly 
distinguished than with laws where the ban is, for example, on "Colored" people, 
which is a general term encompassing various non-white groups.65 Next to these 
explicit laws on the continuum are implied laws, such as laws with a "whites only" 
requirement. This sort of implicit law does not "name" the other, rather "names" the 
opposite, privileged entity. Here, the group's absence could nevertheless signify its 
existence because of the statute’s “wholeness” impact. According to this impact, 
discriminatory statutes are always positioned within a semantic field of "social power 
relations" where the oppressor and oppressed groups are "different" from one another 
and can signify one another.66 In the relatively narrow area of legal discrimination, 
naming the privileged group in a statute signifies the discriminated group as missing 
from the holistic frame of the oppressor and the oppressed, namely, from the statute's 
wholeness. For example, due to the black-white paradigm, "African-Americans" are 
members of a set of mutually exclusive forms of discrimination with "whites" as their 
opposite. This dichotomy is why statutorily privileging a "white" group would signify 
the presence of its "other," specifically African-Americans, but not, for example, the 
presence of Mexican-Americans, since Mexican-Americans are not the dichotomous 
opposite of "whites" and thus are not signified by the inclusion of "whites". Alongside 
this spectrum of visibility, both explicit and implicit de jure discrimination enhances 
the formation of the discriminated group as an entity. 
In sum, de jure discrimination affects the magnitude of the visibility both of 
the existence of the group itself and of its discrimination-based suffering. Working 
from within the legal system, de jure discrimination brought the groups it defined into 
 
65 In the case of Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927), the Supreme Court affirmed a decision that 
allowed the exclusion of a Chinese child from a white school on the ground that the law required 
separate schools for "whites" and "colored" races. Chinese were also considered “Indians” by law. See 
People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854) (prohibiting the testimony of an Indian witness). 
66 Those images are considered to be Greimasian semiotics of law. See, generally, Jackson, supra note 
57, at 31-43. 
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a canonical status through legal texts. Law canonizes discriminated groups, providing 
them the necessary "naming" for all prospective antidiscrimination purposes during a 
later remedial stage.67 Being named by the law has implications just as being named 
by the social sphere or by politicians would. Formal de jure discrimination is more 
systematic and more exposed to the public than de facto discrimination is, thereby 
conveying greater visibility to the subjects of that discrimination. This effect helps 
explain the weak position of Mexican-Americans in the American antidiscrimination 
discourse. Although Mexican-Americans are relatively physically distinct, their 
recognition as a discriminated-against group has lacked any “legal” support since they 
were not discriminated-against by the law; this lack of "legal" support deprives the 
group of legal viability in asserting their claims during the remedial stage. 
 
2) The Collaborating-Organizational Effect  
a) Through intra-group reactions 
 The ability and potential of minorities to politically organize has a key role in 
affecting their political power. Ackerman, who discusses minorities' entitlement to 
judiciary protection, refers to the idea of a “pluralist democracy,” which assumes that 
various interest groups negotiate with one another about the rules that they eventually 
democratically legislate. Within this framework, minority groups suffer from a 
systematic disadvantage, due to their lack of power to negotiate with the powerful 
majority.68 A famous dictum by Justice Stone in the Carolene Products case 
suggested that “discrete and insular minorities” were the ones who suffered most from 
democratic ineffectiveness and were the ones who were eligible for and entitled to 
protection from the judiciary when the legislature failed to provide such protection. 
Ackerman criticizes the Court’s definition. Both insularity and discreteness, he 
argues, have an empowering rather than a disempowering effect on the political 
bargaining power of a group, since these characteristics make the groups more able to 
operate collectively.69 Here, again, the powerful effect of de jure discrimination is of 
enormous relevance. Using legislation to discriminate provokes a sharper sense of 
 
67 Though true that it has to prove each time a concrete discrimination that needs to be addressed, 
discriminated-against group nevertheless is not required to prove that the group itself is identifiable. 
68 See Ackerman, supra note 21, at 719-722. Although critical of the pluralistic democracy ideology, 
Ackerman adheres to it as the leading concern of the judiciary. Id, at 722. 
69 Id, at 723-740.  
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humiliation, of otherness, and of alienated outsiderness.70 The law functions as a 
primary (among other) social instrument in racializing the group, mainly for 
subordinating purposes.71 Consequentially, a group member's consciousness of being 
discriminated against revolves around the notion of the group's oppression as a whole, 
and formal, de jure discrimination makes that group oppression much more powerful, 
painful, and outrageous, thus enhancing an intra-group interaction and collectivity. On 
the other hand, groups that do not suffer from blatant, evidential, formal 
discrimination, but rather suffer from more covert discrimination, are expected to 
have a lesser sense of group identity and a higher level of self-denial of their 
discriminated position, and of intra-group collectivity. 
 In the terms of Ackerman’s critique, the geographical insularity of the group is 
less effective and the discreteness of the group is blurred with non-de jure 
discriminated against groups. The consciousness of any group of its own identity is a 
crucial prerequisite for any organized political action. Hence, the geographical 
advantage is particularly effective where the group has a discrimination-oriented 
consciousness and is less effective in cases where the group lacks such a 
consciousness or where that consciousness is less pronounced. As history 
demonstrates, although both African-Americans and Mexican-Americans lived in 
insularity as groups, the former was more able successfully to organize as a 
community, to develop a racially proud consciousness, and eventually to better, 
relatively speaking, their social status.72 
This effect of de jure discrimination has been previously observed. In 
criticizing the transition from the formal discrimination era of Jim Crow to the formal 
equality era, Kimberle Crenshaw points to the problematic effects that this transition 
has had on the African-American community. Crenshaw criticizes the fact that what 
was primarily abolished through that transition was the symbolic oppression of 
African-Americans represented by legal ordinances, rather than actual, material 
oppression, which consisted of less formal discriminating practices.73 African-
Americans derived much of the collective political power within their community 
from the formal nature of their discrimination, not only vis-à-vis Whites, but also vis-
à-vis themselves. The one-rule-to-all discrimination imposed upon African-Americans 
 
70 See Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights 88-89 (1991). 
71 See Haney Lopez, supra note 9, at 3. 
72 Luna, supra note 13, at 232, 247. 
73 For Crenshaw’s distinction see Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1377. 
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by de jure discrimination had an inclusive effect and almost of all the community 
members--even its most advantaged and pro-assimilationist members--were unable to 
avoid or deny their belonging to the group. This discrimination imprisoned all of them 
under its strict rules, without exception, rendering inefficient most assimilationist 
strategies. Once the shift was made to the formal equality era, important portions of 
the group, particularly those well-off or assimilationist African-Americans, parted 
from it in what Crenshaw calls “the loss of collectivity.”74 Prior to that stage, even the 
Integrationist Movement, a pro-assimilation movement, emphasized difference in its 
agenda and had no illusions of African-Americans belonging to the white 
hegemony.75 Dr. King, an integrationist himself, strictly called upon disobedience to 
de jure discrimination.76 De jure discrimination was also the reason for the evolution 
of and the main target of the revolutionary Black Civil Rights Movement,77 whose 
consciousness was built upon fighting the evil of institutionalized discrimination. A 
black scholar once wrote: "Law does not exist in a vacuum and racism is not solely a 
by-product of law."78 This statement is an apt description of the mindset of the Civil 
Rights Movement of the 1960's. De jure discrimination has been a very powerful 
motivation for the Movement’s admirable struggle.79 
Crenshaw located her critique within the African-Americans and White-
Americans relations, but it can be easily applied to this Article's analysis within 
discriminated-against groups. Unlike their African-American peers, Mexican-
Americans did not suffer from blatant, formally legal alienation and thus were not as 
easily considered-- either by themselves or by others--as “out-laws” from the social 
system. Drawing on Crenshaw’s work, one can infer that the lack of de jure 
discrimination caused “loss of collectivity” within the Mexican-American 
consciousness and encouraged the weak ties between their community identities and a 
racial identity, as opposed to such strong ties within African-Americans.80 The 
 
74 Id, at 1382-1383. 
75 On Dr. King’s conceptions of racism see Derrick Bell, Triumph in Challenge, 54 MD. L. Rev.1691 
(1995). 
76 In the famous “Letter from Birmingham City Jail” Dr. King presented his objection to de jure 
discrimination as derived from respect for law. Martin L. King Jr., Why We Can’t Wait 167 (1963)  
77 Peller, supra note 31, at 809 (presenting Malcolm X's view on segregation). 
78David Hall, Racism and the Limitation of Law: An Afro-centric Perspective of Law, Society and 
Collective Rights 13 (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1988). 
79 Regardless of the criticism of the movement’s concentration on de jure discrimination, the fact that 
the legal struggle should have been accompanied by a social one does not mean that this struggle was 
mistaken. 
80 See Haney Lopez, supra note 9, at 10. 
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absences of de jure discrimination sent a message of assimilation and of false 
belonging to the hegemony,81 which made an elaborated legal fight appear irrelevant 
or even unwanted.82 The history of the Mexican-American civil rights movements 
thus is more complex and assimilative than the history of the African-American civil 
rights movement does. Organizations like the League of United Latin American 
Citizens (LULAC), established in the late 1920's, and the Mexican American's Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), established in the late 1960's, took the 
lead in litigating against the de facto discrimination Mexican-Americans suffered.83 
They relied overwhelmingly on an integrationist and assimilative ideology rather than 
on a separatist or a group-collectivist ideology; perhaps partly for this reason, these 
groups have failed to receive nationwide attention, despite their considerable 
achievements.84 Scholars speculate as to the conditions that have shaped this strategy, 
and the suggestions have ranged from the community’s weak social and political 
condition to an incompatibility among the personalities of the leadership.85 I suggest 
another factor, namely the ambiguity on the part of the American legal system about 
the group’s legal status. The fact that the law did not discriminatorily define the group 
has had an anti-radical impact on the self-consciousness and self-perception of its 
members and leaders with regard to their belonging to a discriminated against group. 
Another aspect of intra-group interaction to which Ackerman points is that the 
more discrete the members of a group are, the easier it is to track them and commit 
them to the group’s political struggle. African-Americans are an example of a discrete 
group, who because of their skin color are easy to track; Ackerman presents 
homosexuals as a counterexample, since their membership is more anonymous and 
not superficially prominent, thereby making homosexuals harder to track and 
politically mobilize. Ackerman furthers argues that even when tracked, a group 
member would have to let go of his or her anonymity in order to engage in a political 
 
81I hereby associate assimilation with the negative quality of false belonging since it is in fact a 
practice of noneacceptance of the identity of the other, as shaped through her racial community. See 
Haney Lopez, supra note 9, at 57-58.   
82 Matt S. Meier & Margo Gutierrez, Encyclopedia of the Mexican American Civil Rights Movements 
130 (2000). LULAC had initiated only two lawsuits in the late 1940s, although these lawsuits were 
fairly substantial. 
83 For a discussion of the myriad of Mexican-American civil rights movements, see id.
84 LULAC’s official constitution mentioned Mexican pride, but emphasized that Mexican-Americans 
were white. Id, at 130. Although the nationalist ideology of the Mexican-American civil rights 
movement was apparent, that nationalism mainly focused on Mexican “border issues”. See Michael 
Omi & Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States from the 1960s to the 1980s 103-04 
(1986). 
85 Meier & Gutierrez, supra note 82, at 127-29. 
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struggle and that this revealing is something members of anonymous groups would 
hesitate to do. By so doing, a member of the anonymous group would risk “revealing” 
his or her identity and would position himself or herself on a social battlefield.86 
Ackerman's discussion of "discreteness" focuses on the physical "visibility" of the 
group, but this Article focuses on the legal dimension of discreteness. Once the group 
is visible to the law, meaning that it has been defined and recognized by the legal 
system through de jure discrimination, that group also becomes more politically 
visible. Thus, although homosexuals are relatively "socially invisible," this Article 
argues that homosexuals are substantively "legally present" and enjoy a substantial 
amount of political visibility.  
The discourse of sexual orientation-based discrimination dealt initially with 
prohibitions on sodomy.87 Later, the struggle for homosexual rights targeted other de
jure provisions, again triggering a legal discussion that increased the legal visibility of 
the group. Until Romer v. Evans,88the Court did not find homosexuals to legally 
constitute a group that was entitled to special constitutional protections. Moreover, in 
the first case to discuss homosexual's right to equal protection, Bowers v. Hardwick,89 
the discussion revolved around homosexual activity rather than homosexuals as an 
entity or group. But Romer led to the law considering homosexuals as a group, even 
though Romer did not grant homosexuals all of the constitutional protection they 
sought. In Romer, homosexuals were discriminated against de jure by a state 
constitution, so the Court’s discussion also has a group-based orientation. Thus, the 
distinctiveness given to the group by the legislature made the group legally viable.90 
Considering groups that are discriminated against de facto extends 
Ackerman’s conception of discreteness to a symbolic level where the law constitutes 
presence. In contrast to homosexuals, members of de facto discriminated against 
groups suffer from “legal anonymity". They are locked in a "legal closet", which 
 
86 Ackerman, supra note 21, at 729-31. 
87 Janet Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Legal Articulation of Sexual Orientation and Identity, in 
After Identity: A Reader in Law and Culture (Dan Danielsen & Karen Engle, 1995). 
88 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
89 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
90 The representation of homosexual people as “a group” is yet to be defined by de jure provisions, 
since those provisions tend to address homosexual activities rather than a homosexual entity. See 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (prohibiting sodomy with de jure provisions). In Lawrence,
the Justices were divided as to whether the issue at hand should be considered as an equal protection 
challenge--conceptualizing the case as group based (the minority)--or as a due process one-- 
conceptualizing the case as activity based (the majority). On the gay status/conduct distinction, see 
Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 Yale L. Jour. 769, 872-73 (2002) (introducing the different 
assimilationist strategies of minorities). 
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enhances their chances for assimilation and enables them to refrain from political 
confrontations.91 In contrast, legally discrete groups who earn their discreteness from  
de jure discrimination cannot as easily ignore or deny their oppression and are more 
limited in their assimilation ability. Thus, members of these groups are far more likely 
to be ready to organize politically to fight for better treatment. The legal discreteness 
of de jure discriminated against groups also creates a supportive social-political 
environment both among the group members and also in the form of goodwill from 
people outside the group who support the abolition of the recognized de jure 
discrimination.92 Having said all that, it is importantly noted that de jure 
discrimination is not the exclusive way through which political collectivity and 
consciousness can be achieved. These can be attained through different and complex 
routes, of which de jure discrimination is only one primary example.93 
b) Through inter-group reactions 
 Legally institutionalized discrimination enhances also the consciousness of 
members outside the discriminated-against group whose members are "legally marked 
out" in a way that makes it relatively easy for others to identify them.94 Reflecting this 
notion is Dean Ely’s psychological approach to the legislative process, which 
represents de jure discrimination as a positioning of the relations between the relevant 
groups in a “we”-“they” dichotomy. "We" refers to the hegemonic oppressor, 
represented by the legislative and "they" refers to the de jure discriminated against 
group.95 In this framework, discrimination constitutes the other as a "minority", in the 
sense of a majority manifesting political superiority over the minority and hence 
forcing the minority to admit its relative political powerlessness and recognize its 
proper place within social power relationships. For example, African-Americans, as 
 
91 Such an analysis adopts the presumption that people would prefer exiting to engaging in a 
confrontation. Ackerman stresses this assumption, relying on Albert Hirschman's work on confronting 
unsatisfactory situations. Ackerman, supra note 21, at 730-31. 
92 The NAACP's struggle, for example, was founded both by both whites and African Americans. See 
Equal Protection and the African-American Constitutional Experience – A Documentary History 179-
181 (Robert P. Greed ed., 2000). 
93 One such course, for example, is demonstrated by the psychological progression that the Mexican-
American activist Guillermo Fuenfrios described in his story: The Emergence of the New Chicano, as 
extracted at Haney Lopez, supra note 9, at 50-53.   
94 Ackerman. supra note 21, at 729-730. 
95 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980). I refrain from using this analysis to justify court 
intervention, as Ely does, and rather borrow the idea of the alienating power of discriminating laws. 
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the addressees of the discriminating laws, could not see themselves as its authors.96 
Understood this way, a lack of de jure discrimination against a de facto discriminated 
group creates an "we-all" as opposed to a "we-they" political structure, which eases 
any traces of distinctiveness and discourages the development of a group 
consciousness among the de facto discriminated against group.   
This notion is clear in the Mexican-American case, where since they suffered 
from de facto discrimination, Mexican-Americans were treated by court as "the other 
white," a group that deserved not to be discriminated against.  This “other white” 
strategy97 demonstrates the coalescing effect, where neither side in the discriminatory 
regime develops a consciousness of real power relations between the parties. 
Moreover, symbolically this strategy was a statement about the inclusiveness of 
Mexican-Americans and their lack of distinctiveness from whites.98 In Mendez v. 
Westminster School Dist. Of Orange County,99 where Mexican-Americans won the 
right to have schools integrated because the court considered them to be "white"," the 
court distinguished them from de jure discriminated against groups. Relying on 
California’s rules forbidding discrimination unless it was against colored and black 
people, the court concluded that the discrimination against the plaintiffs was 
unconstitutional. This decisions furthered the symbolic effect of the “we”-“they” 
dichotomy, whereby Mexican Americans were placed within the “we” group and not 
in the “they” group. Mexican-Americans were thus considered “one of the great 
races” and contrasted with other races that were denied equal participation in 
education.100 But this placement of Mexican-Americans in the "we" group fails to 
acknowledge the power relations between Whites and Mexican-Americans. In this 
power relationship, Mexican-Americans are a discriminated against minority, but the 
court's decisions instead position Mexican-Americans side by side with whites. Thus, 
de jure discriminated against groups, were marked as “the real” others, whereas 
 
96 Here this Article adopts Habermasian terms. Jurgen Habermas, Struggles for Recognition in the 
Democratic Constitutional State, in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition 107, 121-
122 (Charles Taylor et al., 1994). 
97 On the employment of this strategy by activists see Rangel & Alcala, supra note 15, at 342-48. 
98 This strategy was first triggered by the determination of citizenship eligibility to Mexican-Americans 
after the Mexican-American war. See Menchaca, supra note 9, at 584. The strategy was well 
established at the middle of the 20th century, and can be demonstrated at the 1940 national census 
which stipulated that “Mexicans were to be listed as white…”. See Haney Lopez, supra note 9, at 51. 
99 161 F.2d 774 (Cal. 1947). 
100 Id, at 780. 
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Mexican-Americans were not the other. This explains part of the difficulty Mexican 
Americans had in their quest for recognition as a “group”.101 
3) The Institutional Memory and Blameworthy Effects 
Antidiscrimination rules are meant to rectify the countermajoritanian 
difficulties minorities face and to redress harmful injuries that the law or society has 
inflicted upon them. 102 Therefore, institutional memory and blameworthiness suggest 
that it is important for the same legal mechanisms that discriminated to be the 
mechanisms used to provide the remedies. De jure discrimination provides direct, 
formal access to the legal system's remedial functions for de jure discriminated-
against groups. The formalism of the legal system and the documentary nature of de 
jure discrimination make such discrimination impossible for the legal system to 
ignore. De jure discrimination is less likely or plausibly to be denied than de facto 
discrimination is. Although nations tend to forget their historical evils, 
institutionalized documents make such forgetfulness harder. A legislative and 
adjudicative change of hearts does not erase the legal history of a nation, but rather 
place another narrative next to that history. Discriminatory legal rules can be 
expunged from a nation’s book of statutes, but their past existence viability is always 
evident and traceable. The vast documentation of the Jim Crow regulations and the 
judicial revisiting of Dred Scott103 and Plessy demonstrate the strong presence of the 
past institutional suffering of African-Americans. This documented past was during 
the remedial stage a source for vast legal condemnation of the past institutional 
suffering and thus a firm justification for remediation.104 
De jure discrimination powerfully situates its subjects within the legal system 
as the subjects of legal practice. Reflecting again on Ackerman’s work, one might 
observe that the judiciary restricts its activism with regard to “non-legal” issues. The 
judiciary's commitment to protecting discrete and insular minorities assumes some 
prior legal recognition of such minority groups. Therefore, it is crucial to understand 
the discrete and insular minorities test as being inherently legal. This test aims at 
 
101 See Delgado & Palacio, supra note 7. 
102 The goals of an antidiscrimination regime are varied and are not merely formal.  See Brest, supra 
note 3, at 6-9. Brest, though, speaks in terms of preventing harms to minorities, whereas this Article 
also focuses on correcting harms already done to minorities. 
103 Dred Scott v. Stanford, 60 U.S. (19 How) 393 (1857) 
104 See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (allowing affirmative action). 
30
protecting groups from de jure discrimination alone. Other forms of discrimination 
are not thought of as proper areas for judicial intervention due to the traditional 
legal/social dichotomy that seeks to preserve the "social" as a sphere beyond equality 
law and thus that allows for the continuation of racial inequality outside the official 
reach of the state.105 As this Article has previously argued, Mexican-Americans were 
only partially recognized by the legal system. Since they did not suffer from de jure 
discrimination, it was easier to consider Mexican-Americans to be a “social” rather 
than a “legal” entity. The Court’s reluctance to declare that the discrimination against 
Mexican-Americans was de jure meant that Mexican-Americans had no legal 
relevance as a group. In the Hernandez case, the Court focused to “social” 
motivations for discrimination rather than “legal” ones, thus deriving the “emergence” 
of the Mexican-American group within this specific from a change in "community 
prejudices" against them. Moreover, the wisdom of the Court's reliance on "social 
changes" triggering recognition of Mexican-Americans is challenged by the fact that 
discrimination against Mexican-American was by far long lasting.106 In the case of de 
jure discriminated-against groups, the law’s involvement transformed what might 
have otherwise been considered a "wholly social" matter in to a “wholly legal” one, 
by establishing the group as having legal viability. For example, in the famous case of 
Strauder v. West Virginia,107 the Court focused on the devastating impact of de jure 
discrimination in excluding African-Americans from “civil society.” This observation 
conceives the social harm inflicted on them as also being a legal harm.  
Many conservative legal theories and positive legalism claim that law merely 
reflects society's desires. The critique from the left, on the other hand, argues that the 
law is actively involved in the production and maintenance of society's power 
relations. This debate, though, is less important once legal involvement is present in 
the wronging. Through de jure discrimination the legal system created as well as 
reflected reality, unraveling the line between the legal and the social realms.108 Under 
these circumstances, adherence to the legal righting process is to be expected, because 
once the law had been formally involved in "wronging," there is a need for it to 
 
105 This tactic is well-established in American equality laws. See Angela P. Harris, Symposium on Law 
in the Twentieth Century: Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth Century Race Law,
88 Calif. L. Rev. 1923, 1935 (2000). 
106 For the history of the subordination and oppression of Mexican-Americans, see Arnold De Leon, 
They Called Them Greasers: Anglo Attitudes Toward Mexicans in Texas 1821-1900 (1983). 
107 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
108 Kennedy, supra note 59, at 347. 
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reverse its involvement. The high attention that de jure discriminated-against groups 
receive from the legal system during the remedial stage can be understood as a result 
of a corrective justice aspiration of the legal system to right undeniable past wrongs 
that were caused by this very same system.109 
Affirmative action is the most prominent manifestation of this effect. 
Although the American legal system had not yet developed a well-established 
position as to affirmative action's constitutionality or normative desirability, 
affirmative action programs have nonetheless been judicially approved.110 The 
inclination of courts in these cases to generally hold against general affirmative action 
programs while approving programs that aim to remedy concrete legal discrimination 
highlights the importance of de jure discrimination. The more concrete and unjust the 
past discrimination was--particularly if such discrimination resulted from the legal 
system itself rather than simply from society--the more justified present affirmative 
action is.111 This is the essence of antidiscrimination law, as Robert Post describes it: 
“…antidiscrimination law always begins and ends in history, which means that it 
must participate in the very practices that it seeks to alter and regulate.”112 The 
involvement of the judiciary benefiting de jure discriminated-against groups in the 
remedial stage can thus be understood as being motivated by institutional 
remorsefulness.113 
A story of one Mexican-American battle against discrimination can also help 
illustrate this effect. The story, called “The Felix Longoria Incident”, occurred in 
Texas in 1949. Longoria was an American soldier who died during World War II. The 
local mortician refused to allow him to be buried at the chapel because of Longoria’s 
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Mexican origin.114 Hector Garcia, an activist working for a Mexican-American Forum 
challenged this discrimination. As with most of the discriminatory acts against 
Mexican-Americans in Texas, the burial refusal was not de jure based. As 
demonstrated by the substantial sympathetic public attention that this case received, 
the public reaction to the discrimination claim – one of denial — was of a different 
nature than if the discrimination had been based in law and hence “legal”. The 
incident was portrayed as an atypical incident, even though in fact separate burial 
services and cemeteries were common. It was resolved as a misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation of the funeral house owner's words. Since the mortician's behavior 
lacking any official approval in law, the public blamed Garcia for stirring up trouble 
in an area where problems did not truly existed  
 These types of public denials of the reality of discrimination are typical with 
non-de jure discrimination. Similar de jure discrimination could not have been 
denied. The truth of de jure discrimination neither relies on matters of interpretation 
over “what exactly has been said” nor does it rely on the credibility of the party 
alleging discrimination, since in both cases the law is clearly authorizing 
discrimination. Since de jure discrimination is institutionalized, its effect cannot be 
dismissed as a private, unrepresentative dispute as de facto discrimination often can 
be. Declaring war on de jure discrimination is more likely to generate public support 
than war on de facto discrimination, to which the public might respond as it did to 
Garcia's work that the activists are just stirring up trouble. De jure discrimination is 
more difficult to rationalize or deny. As a result, this de facto discrimination case with 
the Texas burial was resolved on a very local, specific, "non-legal" level and the 
mortician agreed, eventually, to bury Longoria. 
 
4) The Presumption of Intentional Discrimination Effect 
 The legacy of de jure discrimination has an active role in proving the 
discriminatory intent of a challenged discriminatory act. The presence of de jure 
discrimination is an important factor in establishing that a discriminatory act was 
intentional. This role is exemplified by the Court's statement that the intent behind 
explicit de jure discrimination in the past may be used in the present to prove intent 
 
114 This incident is detailed in the biography of Hector P. Garcia, a Mexican-American activist. Ignacio 
M. Garcia, Hector P. Garcia: In Relentless Pursuit of Justice 104-39 (2002). 
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regardless of chronological remoteness.115 Unsurprisingly, this logic was applied 
primarily in cases where de jure discrimination previously existed.116 The practical 
implication of this logic is large because equal protection claims are limited to claims 
that can prove intentional discrimination, and this logic allows the court to assume 
intentional discrimination. This logic thus has a "narrating" effect, where it allows the 
group's narrative of oppression to be told.117 Moreover, the "narrating" effect also has 
an epistemological effect by causing the narrated information to be absorbed into the 
formal legal system and used by the narrating group to achieve redress for past 
discrimination. In other words, the logic is that the institutionalization of de jure 
discrimination signified a pattern of oppressive behavior that could be used to prove 
intentionality, whereas de facto discrimination was perceived as non-institutional, 
incidental, and random and thus could not be used to prove the intentionality 
necessary to assert an equal protection claim.118 
Conclusion: Externalities for Cases of De Facto Discrimination 
The formal, overt, linguistic dimension of different forms of discrimination has 
powerful effects that both courts and scholars have so far neglected. As with any 
discourse, the discrimination discourse dictates the way in which discriminated 
groups are construed and imposes frameworks that structure what can be experienced 
or what meaning an experience can encompass. Thus, discourse influences what can 
be said, thought, and done. 
The unhappy result of the fact that discrimination discourse is framed in the 
context of de jure discrimination, is that it prevents the formation of group identities 
of de facto discriminated-against groups, whose composition might be more complex, 
contextualized, and historicized than the composition of de jure discriminated against 
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groups.119 Thus, the primacy of de jure discrimination in the discrimination discourse 
shaped the way in which the formation of "legally cognized groups" became possible 
and thereby limited the antidiscrimination discourse to encompassing primarily de
jure discriminated against groups. De jure discrimination structured what could or 
could not be included in the discrimination discourse; most importantly, the 
dominance of de jure discrimination largely prevented de facto discriminated groups 
from participating in the antidiscrimination discourse. 
 It is important to note though that there is no strict, clear relation between the 
legal status of a group and the social status of a group as one that is discriminated 
against. Some groups may not be discriminated-against by the law and yet suffer 
discrimination from society. De facto discriminated-against groups demonstrate this 
idea well. At the same time, some groups may be de jure discriminated against by the 
law without being discriminated against by society in fact.120 Nevertheless, in 
between these poles, there is certainly a correlation between the use of the law to 
order society and between enhancing the social and self-awareness around a group 
subjugated to de jure discrimination in a way needed for that group to initiate an 
effective legal and political struggle for rights. Moreover, removing a group from 
society's legal canon and by no longer discriminating against it under the law, in the 
antidiscrimination stage also creates some sense of social commitment to equality vis-
à-vis that group.121 
Part III: 
The Battle for Segregation in Education as a Test Case 
 The impact of the abovementioned effects on equal protection doctrine is 
somewhat elusive and will be introduced in this Part by examining the segregation in 
education litigation of both African and Mexican Americans. The impact is more 
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apparent in the Mexican-American litigation, where the court refused to identify the 
group, and less apparent in African-American litigation, where the court refrained 
from any similar discussion of group identity. Rulings on education segregation 
regarding theses groups demonstrate this difference in impact. Both groups suffered 
from segregation in education, but while African-Americans suffered mainly from de 
jure discrimination, Mexican-Americans suffered almost exclusively from de facto 
discrimination. In terms of judicial success, Mexican-Americans were the firsts to win 
a segregation battle, in the Mendez case in 1946.122. But African-Americans won the 
war in the broader legal sense with Brown v. Board of Education in 1954.123 Although 
vastly criticized,124 this decision is a cornerstone of abolishing segregation and the 
"separate but equal" doctrine. A compelling explanation for Brown's central status in 
the discrimination discourse might be its emphasis on African-Americans' suffering 
and social exclusion through de jure discrimination. The NAACP, which argued the 
case, narrated African-American suffering through briefs and professional opinions 
and court embraced that narrative,125 stressing the story of the group’s oppression: 
"To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their 
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may 
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone".126 Court thus 
brought the suffering of African-American children--and through them the African-
American people--into the legal system and made that suffering intrinsic to the 
group's legal entity. The institutionalized discrimination at issue in the case also 
represented the broader story of discrimination of educational bodies against African-
Americans.127 In Brown, Court has recognized the existence of a suffering, 
discriminated-against general group of African-Americans. Introducing the petitioners 
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as “minors of the Negro race,” Court has affirmed, and acknowledged without 
reservations their status as a legally identifiable group.128 
The impact of Brown was "legal recognition," as Derrick Bell states: "The 
significance of this decision is that it altered the status of African-Americans who 
were no longer supplicants … 'seeking, pleading, begging to be treated as full-fledged 
members of the human race….'"129 More importantly, from Brown onward, the 
viability of every segregation claim brought into court by African-Americans was 
immediately and fully discussed. No special rhetoric and epistemological efforts were 
required by courts to define the petitioners or their discriminated-against position. 
This ease of asserting claims was the unfelt yet crucial impact of de jure 
discrimination, which established African-Americans’ group recognition.130 The 
conceptualization of the litigation as one seeking equality between different 
identifiable groups prompted African-Americans seeking for equality to bring their 
segregation claims to court. De jure discrimination thus had a structural effect that 
enabled the group to gain control over attempts to reshape the educational system.131 
The experience of Mexican-Americans seeking to gain legal recognition as a 
group differed tremendously from that of African-Americans.132 As this Article has 
argued earlier, the discrimination against Mexican-Americans was primarily non-de
jure and their status as a legally cognizable minority group is fragile.133 The scarcity 
of legislation related to Mexican-Americans led to an insufficient amount of litigation 
by or against Mexican-Americans, which prevented a coherent and a comprehensive 
identity of the group and its real suffering from forming. Mendez, one of the few cases 
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to have dealt with de jure discrimination against Mexican-Americans, is thus 
unsurprisingly considered a milestone in the group's struggle for equality. 
Nevertheless, the Mendez decision blurred the legal status of Mexican-Americans as 
an identifiable group and blurred their suffering. Considering them to be "whites," the 
court said that since they were "whites" they were not appropriate subjects for 
discriminatory treatment since state law did not allow for discrimination against 
whites.134 This strategy of labeling Mexican-Americans as white was destructive to 
Mexican-Americans, since it did not mesh with social behavior toward Mexican-
Americans or with the power relation from which Mexican-Americans suffered.135 
And with this rare de jure discrimination case, it is clear that a statute explicitly 
allowing de jure segregation of Mexican-Americans would have destroyed the court's 
reasoning; if de jure segregation had been applied against Mexican-Americans, it 
could have surfaced the suffering of the Mexicans-American group. 
Mendez was followed by Gonzales v. Sheely,136 in which a federal court in 
Arizona ruled on a segregation claim. Like Mendez, this case was also highly 
atypically and based on de jure discrimination against Mexican-Americans. In 
Gonzales, the court identified the petitioners before him as a class based on the fact 
that the regulations allowed the segregation of “all children of persons of Mexican or 
Latin descent or extraction”; thus, the court used this de jure “naming” of the group in 
its ruling.137 Court also referred to such blatant segregation as degrading and fostering 
antagonism against and inferiority in Mexican-American children.138 In later cases, 
however, where the discrimination was not de jure as in Mendez and Gonzales, legal 
recognition of Mexican-Americans as a group has not been forthcoming. Courts, 
frightened by their inability to determine precisely the contours of the group, 
continued to only apply ad-hoc group recognition to the specific petitioners before the 
 
134 Mendez, supra note 99, at 780. 
135 For extensive research on race-based segregation against Mexican-Americans, see Delgado & 
Palacios, supra note 7, at 392-95 
136 96 F. Supp 1004 (Ariz. 1951). 
137 Id, at p. 1006. The court declared that the group constituted a class in terms of the right to bring a 
class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. Another source of 
"naming" is the petitioner's brief, which had a limited effect on the court. See, e.g., Morales v. Shannon,
366 F. Supp. 813 (Tex. 1973) (identifying the plaintiff as Mexican-American and explaining that the 
court inclines to name plaintiffs the way plaintiffs name themselves). On the other hand, the court used 
the word "Negro" for African-Americans without any explanation. 
138 Gonzales, supra note 136, at 1007. 
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court rather than recognize Mexican-Americans as a group more generally.139 Without 
a general recognition for the group, the group members had to reassert and reconstruct 
each time the group identity in order to assert discrimination claims. Later on, the 
prerequisite that challenged discrimination be de jure rather than de facto blocked 
many other petitions challenging discrimination against Mexican-Americans.140 
Along with other factors, the effects of the discrimination against Mexican-Americans 
being de facto rather than de jure can help understand how in contrast to African-
Americans, Mexican-Americans today continue to attend the most segregated schools 
and today they are "more segregated" and "more concentrated in high-poverty schools 
than any other group of students” in the United States.141 142 
The end of Jim Crow in the late-1950’s and the passage of the Civil Rights 
Acts in the mid-1960’s signified the end of de jure discrimination and, with it, the end 
of the immediate effects of the de jure/de facto distinction. America has gradually 
moved from the discriminating stage and entered into the remedial stage, which 
utilized a colorblind notion, whereby reason and neutrality replaced prejudice and 
stereotyping, which governed de jure discrimination rhetoric.143 The shift between the 
stages symbolized a shift from negotiating equality through difference to negotiating 
it through sameness, and the gap between discriminated-against groups has 
narrowed.144 Mexican-Americans (as well as other non-de jure discriminated-against 
groups, for example Arabs) became actors that were allowed to use antidiscrimination 
relief in their favor and allowed to gradually forming a "discriminated group" 
 
139 See, for example, U.S. v. State of Texas, 342 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Tex. 1971), where the court referred 
to the students “in this case” as constituting a legally identifiable group. Also see Texas Education 
Agency, where the Court is more generous, yet holds some confines on the recognition of Mexican-
Americans, saying: "Mexican-Americans in many cities in Texas are an identifiable ethnic 
minority…". The recognition of the group is being thus geographically limited to "many cities in 
Texas" only. 
140 See Martinez, supra note 18 at 584-606.  
141 This was the conclusion of The President's Advisory Commission on Educational Excellence for 
Hispanic Americans. Kristi L. Bowman, (Note) The New Face of School Desegregation, 50 Duke L.J. 
1751, 1783 (2001) (citations omitted). 
142 Id, at 852: “Nevertheless, in many other cases where members of both groups applied jointly, there 
was no such inquiry as to the status of Mexican-Americans. My guess would be that the presence of 
African-Americans as petitioners redeemed the group recognition problem of Mexican-Americans 
since the former constituted the required eligibility for relief against the white hegemony anyway. See,
for example, Soria v. Oxnard School Dist. Board of Trustees, 328 F. Supp. 155. 
143 Race-consciousness was considered the main component of white supremacy ideology. Peller, supra 
note 31, at 759-61. 
144 This is apparent in the evolution of race law in the 20th-century. See Harris, supra note 105. For 
Title VII purposes, African and Mexican Americans were considered as equally eligible for protection. 
See Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977); Ortiz v. Bank of America, 547 F. 
Supp. 550, 558 (Cal. 1982). 
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identity.145 The use of more flexible terms like “national origin” to describe groups 
against which discrimination is prohibited has an inclusive effect of helping establish 
group identity for many de facto discriminated-against groups.146 Likewise, the 
“unreasonable classification” discourse that evolved during this colorblind era 
displaced the racial oppression discourse, which was a key factor in making 
recognized group as a discriminated-against one.147 Within this new system, the status 
of de facto discriminated-against groups has improved because these changes have 
given hope for recognition of the group and for full participation in antidiscrimination 
relief.148 Moreover, the Civil Rights Acts banned a larger range of discriminatory 
practices than just simple de jure ones, including relatively “private” forms that were 
closer to de facto discrimination. The Civil Rights Acts banned both intentional and 
unintentional discrimination and has largely departed from the old view of the Equal 
Protection Clause primarily redressing de jure discrimination.149 These notions have 
influenced the recognition of groups in equal protection claims. With Mexican-
Americans, in this era the group began to be recognized as either a “race” or as a 
“national origin.”150 In contrast, in the new legal order where de jure discrimination 
has ceased, the powerful effects of legal symbolization of African-American racial 
existence and suffering led to the false belief that racism ended, even though the 
material subordination of African-Americans has not stopped. Rather, discrimination 
against African-Americans has become more de facto-based than de jure-based, and 
has thus become harder to claim and to fight.151 
145 See for example Cisneros, supra note 14 ("identifiable ethnic group"); Keyes, supra note 16, 
("protected ethnic minority group"). For the refusal of lower courts to consider race and nationality 
classifications as equally violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Sanchez v. State, 181 S.W.2d 87, 
90 (Tex. Crim. 1944). 
146 This shift has, nonetheless, a regressive effect on the notion of "race" as a social construct and its 
vast implications within LatCrit theory. See Haney Lopez, supra note 42. 
147 See Colker, Anti-Subordination above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
1003 (1986) (stressing the anti-subordination perspective as better representing the equal protection 
notion). 
148 See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (declaring unconstitutional a 
school board's bargaining agreement that aimed at maintaining the percentage of minority personnel 
during a layoff); City of Richmond v. Croson, 480 U.S. 469 (1989) (nullifying as unconstitutional a 
municipal provision to set aside a certain amount of contracts to minority business enterprises). For a 
critique of these cases, see Bell, supra note 129, at 854-864. 
149 This development started with Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) and became more systematic 
and widely approved of with the enactment of the Civil Right Acts. For the conceptual shift embedded 
in this development, see Michael W. Comb & Gwendolyn M. Comb, Revisiting Brown v. Board of 
Education: A Cultural, Historical-Legal, and Political Perspective, 47 How. L. Jour. 627, 650-656 
(2004). 
150 See supra note ??. 
151 For this effect see Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1369-1386. 
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Part IV: Pleading and Proving Discrimination within the Streaming from De 
facto to De jure Paradigm – A Call for Substance, Context, and Consciousness 
 This Article stresses a phenomenological analysis, thus it is beyond the 
confines of the article to suggest a full elaboration of the different ways through 
which the legal system should treat differently discriminated-against groups. Instead, 
in this Part the Article briefly points to the general possibility of expanding the limits 
of the rights discourse through contextualization so that the rights discourse can 
include de facto discriminated-against groups in its remedial stage. In order to 
accomplish this inclusion, the legal system needs to develop a mechanism for 
pleading and proving discrimination within the streaming from de facto/de jure 
paradigm that uses a contextualized and historicized approach to inquire into the 
social-political background of the formation of a group as discriminated-against. Law 
and its rights discourse are highly de-contextualized and de-historicized by their 
alleged objective and universal nature, and thus they lack the conceptual room to 
consider contextualized issues.152 But it is only by being read against a contextual 
background that the absence of de facto discriminated-against racial groups from the 
legal narrative be understood as signifying double discrimination rather than as 
signifying no discrimination. The argument here suggests that the law should move 
toward a contextual and flexible test when implementing the Equal Protection Clause. 
Of course, however, there are many factors that go into framing the proper rule, and 
this Article's focus is too narrow to discuss all of them, but nonetheless the arguments 
laid out here do suggest at least some movement toward greater contextualization and 
flexibility in applying antidiscrimination laws. 
 Contextualizing the discrimination discourse is compatible with the 
transformation through which discrimination as a social construct has been going as it 
moved in the last decades from first-generation discrimination to second-generation 
discrimination.153 One prominent characteristic of this transformation is that 
discrimination is typically no longer formal and blatant but rather is contextual and 
relational. The disappearance of blatant and intentional, discrimination practices and 
the emergence of more subtle ones represent this conceptual and structural shift in the 
discrimination discourse. First-generation discrimination violated clear and 
 
152 Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1597 (1990). 
153 For this distinction and its vast implications, see Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment 
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458 (2001) 
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uncontroversial norms of fairness and formal equality. In contrast, second generation 
discrimination frequently involves patterns of interaction among groups that over time 
lead to the exclusion of non-dominant groups in a way that makes the discrimination 
difficult to trace back to the intentional, discrete actions of particular actors.154 The 
absence of systematic institutional reflection about these patterns of second generation 
discrimination contributes to its cumulative discriminatory effect.155 This generational 
distinction is helpful in analyzing the de jure/de facto distinction’s role in forming 
legally cognizable discriminated-against groups. The first generation's 
institutionalized, horizontal, and formal discrimination scheme is the de jure style of 
discrimination, whereas the second generation is a more complex and contextual style 
of discrimination, the de facto style of discrimination. But although de facto 
discriminated groups suffer from second generation discrimination style, they may 
suffer from it within a system that is also engaged in first generation discrimination. 
The experience of these de facto discriminated-against groups challenges the one-
dimensional perception of discrimination. These groups are legal non-entities that 
signify the existence of sophisticated discrimination forms within what first-
generation discrimination. Indeed, one role de jure discrimination plays is to hide the 
existence of co-existing de facto discrimination, and antidiscrimination laws should 
keep this role in mind. 
 In this respect, this Article joins other calls to employ a critical approach to 
Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.156 With de facto discriminated-against groups, 
courts must adopt alternative, less formal ways of proving discrimination. An 
example of this approach is Supreme Court’s decision in Castaneda v. Partida, where 
the Court applied a substantive test to gauge discrimination. The Mexican-American 
petitioner alleged a violation of the equal protection clause in a Texas jury selection. 
Ruling in the Mexican-American's favor, Court relied on statistical evidences on the 
low percentage of Mexican-American jurors, concluding that this low percentage 
could only be explained by intent to discriminate. Although it has not waived the 
intentional discrimination prerequisite for asserting equal protection claims, the Court 
has relaxed the traditional practice that proving intent requires a demonstration of de
154 Id, at 465-485. 
155 For these characteristics of second-generation discrimination, see id, at 471-472. 
156 See, e.g., Andrew Luger, (Note) Liberal Theory as Constitutional Doctrine: A Critical Approach to 
Equal Protection, 73 Geo. L. J. 153 (1984). 
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jure discrimination.157 Later in this case, the Court also affirmed the status of 
Mexican-Americans as an identifiable group and on that basis upheld the petitioner's 
constitutional claim. 
A critical test seeking to provide substantial protection against discrimination 
would need to be aware of and concerned with the formal-substantive discrimination 
distinction. The unique situation of de facto discriminated-against groups compels the 
application of a more flexible, contextualized and historicized tests to deal with their 
discrimination claims. Courts should be more suspicious of the harm that de facto 
discriminated-against groups have suffered. In the case of Mexican Americans, courts 
should not require petitioners to prove each time that they are a discriminated-against 
group, and courts should also not limit their rulings to the specific circumstances of 
each case. 
 The case for Mexican-American should be thus contextualized. Reflecting on 
the relationship between legal recognition and de jure discrimination, a simple 
proposition might be that an explanation for the higher levels of recognition given to 
de jure discriminated-against groups is the supposition that these groups suffered 
more. This might be true, but  as a theoretical matter the nature of the suffering--be it 
de jure or de facto--should have no bearing on whether a group is recognized as a 
group and is entitled to de jure antidiscrimination remedies in its favor, but rather on 
the breadth of these remedies. 
Whatever the motives behind the non-de jure discrimination of the Mexican-
Americans were,158 the outcome of that discrimination was legally-untraceable 
discrimination. This form of untraceable discrimination further disadvantaged this 
group vis-à-vis de jure discriminated-against groups during the remedial stage. 
Mexican-Americans were subjugated by a hegemony that was not too “different” 
from them, compared with the other de jure discriminated-against group of African-
 
157 For a flexible test that finds intentional discrimination with Mexican-Americans, see Ian F. Haney 
Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 Yale 
L. J. 1711 (2000). The use of statistics to find intentional discrimination is rare. Constitutional Law, 
supra note 6, at 524.  
158 With regard to Mexican-Americans, for example, one can speculate that the strong oppressive effect 
of de facto discrimination made it unnecessary for the hegemony to use the explicit form of de jure 
discrimination. Another speculation might be that diplomatic issues with Mexico, which strongly 
opposed a race-based differentiation of Mexican-Americans, contributed to the U.S. refraining from 
using the de jure discrimination apparatus. Greenfield & Kates, supra note 8, at 683-684. This was 
especially relevant in light of the U.S.-Mexico treaties that promised citizenship to former Mexicans as 
“whites”. Inland Steel Co. v. Barcelona, 39 N.E. 2nd 800 (Ind. 1942). It is also plausible to assume that 
the Mexican-American elite itself opposed such de jure practices, mainly out of a belief that this would 
grant them access to the mainstream (I wish to thank Gerald torres for this point). 
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Americans, thus making it complicated for the law to differentiate them from their 
white hegemonic counterpart: the easier it is for the law to identify the group, the 
easier it is for the law to discriminate against that group.159 Moreover, adopting highly 
contextual group definitions might go against the hegemony’s interest in making clear 
legal distinctions between itself and its "other" as a means of justifying the 
discrimination against this "other".160 This inherent difficulty of applying de jure 
discriminate against fairly similar groups led to a false belief -- produced by the legal 
system -- that no discrimination occurred against these groups. Instead, although they 
enjoyed formal equality, Mexican-Americans suffered from substantial de facto 
discrimination. This arrangement caused their "non-clusion" when they were barred 
from participating in the eventual remedial stage. 
Mexican-Americans thus cross into the rights discourse from a unique 
position. The discrimination discourse's rhetorical adherence to the difference-
sameness dichotomy guaranteed legal and social inclusion and entitlement for equal 
rights only to "similar" people.161 This dichotomy relies on the concept of unity, 
which prevents a discussion from developing about discrimination that imposes 
different outcomes among sub-groups of supposedly “similar” people.162 Mexican-
Americans share an illusory "sameness" with the hegemony; specifically, they share 
the fact that they are different from the ultimate defined African-American "other" 
and they are not subject to de jure discrimination. The myth of these commonalities 
between Mexican-Americans and the American white hegemony was so deeply 
rooted that it prevented Mexican-Americans from being identified as a distinct 
 
159 Moreover, the Court denied attempts to complicate those categorizations, even when the "new 
category" contained an intersection of two former familiar bases, such as race and gender. See 
Kimberle Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and Politics, in The Politics 
of Law – A Progressive Critique 195 (Ed: David Kairys, 1990) (criticizing the court's dismissal of a 
black woman's petition for damages based on being sexually harassed, both on the basis of race and 
gender). 
160 De jure discrimination against Mexican-Americans, for example, would have risked blurring the 
white/black distinction, which was invaluable to whites. See George A. Martinez, Mexican Americans 
and Whiteness, 2 Harv.-Latino L. Rev. 321 (1997). 
161 Martha Minow describes this as the failure of rights analysis to escape the dilemma of difference. 
Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law 147 (1990). 
162 This Article has borrowed this idea from the analysis of the non-Israeli-Palestinians as located 
outside a frame of belonging to the Zionist vision. Outside the frame is how they were situated, not as a 
"missing part" needed to be reconstructed into the frame of Israeli society, but rather as the "differend", 
where the parties involved are presumed to have no common share of norms or ground on which their 
conflict can be adjudicated. Raef Zreik, Palestine, Apartheid, and the Rights Discourse, Jour. of 
Palestine Stud. 133 (2004). 
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discriminated-against group that could have some legal relevance within the 
antidiscrimination discourse. 
Part V: Conclusion 
Nothing in this Article should be read as favoring discrimination; instead, the 
goal of this Article is to take a more nuanced approach to the effects of different 
forms of discrimination on the legal recognition of different groups. Being a legally 
cognizable group might indeed prove insufficient for preventing racial 
discrimination,163 but nevertheless this Article argues that the law is capable of 
improving the overall well being of a group. De facto discriminated-against groups 
have not suffered the same wrongs that de jure discriminated-against groups have 
suffered; nevertheless, a group's status as being de facto discriminated-against is very 
important for determining a group's position. This importance is particularly salient in 
the remedial stage; since the entitlement to legal relief is affected by the existence of 
de jure discrimination and groups that suffer primarily from de facto discrimination 
are unable to take advantage of these remedial mechanisms. This Article has tried to 
illuminate the phenomenology through which these groups have generated their 
identities and have followed different paths in the remedial legal system based on the 
different forms of discrimination they suffered.  
While the legal system’s abstention from the use of overt discrimination 
against a group may be interpreted as an actual lack of discrimination, it can be also 
seen as a form of appropriating the realm of discrimination, hence facilitating 
exclusion rather than producing inclusion of the group. In determining the scope of 
the eligibility of a de facto discriminated group for antidiscrimination relief, courts 
should keep in mind the fact that the position of de facto discriminated-against groups 
is a case study on the foolishness of the belief that what we see in the law is all that 
exists. 
 
163 See Volokh, supra note110, at 314. Volokh warns against the looseness of the strict scrutiny 
standard, which might fail to protect against some discriminatory practices.  
